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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article examines Louisiana law regulating the circumstances 
under which oil and gas activities may be conducted on co-owned 
land or on land burdened by a co-owned mineral servitude.1 Although 
this important topic has been considered in other writings,2 a more 
current examination is in order because no prior commentary has 
considered the significant amendments to the Louisiana Mineral Code 
in 1988. 
“Ownership of the same thing by two or more persons is 
ownership in indivision.”3 Also known as co-ownership, the Civil 
Code further provides that “[t]wo or more persons may own the 
same thing in indivision, each having an undivided share.”4 A 
person owning along with others an undivided interest in the same 
thing is called a co-owner or an owner in indivision. For purposes 
of ownership, a person must be a natural person or a juridical 
person.5 
“Tracts of land, with their component parts, are immovables.”6 
Hence, land is a corporeal7 thing which is susceptible of being 
owned in indivision.  
Co-ownership of land might arise in a variety of ways. While 
the most typical situation giving rise to co-ownership is that 
resulting from a recognized mode of disposition or alienation of 
land to two or more persons (such as sale, donation, or exchange), 
it might also arise as a consequence of inheritance8 or divorce 
                                                                                                             
 1. First recognized by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Frost-Johnson 
Lumber Co. v. Salling’s Heirs, 91 So. 207 (La. 1922), a mineral servitude is now 
codally defined as “the right of enjoyment of land belonging to another for the 
purpose of exploring for and producing minerals and reducing them to 
possession and ownership.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:21 (2000). 
 2. John M. Shuey, Some Problems of Co-ownership in Louisiana Mineral 
Law, in TWELFTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON MINERAL LAW 63 (George W. Hardy, 
III ed., 1965); Thomas A. Harrell, Problems Created by Coownership in 
Louisiana, in THIRTY-SECOND ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON MINERAL LAW 379 
(Patricia A. Geier ed., 1986); Angela Jeanne Crowder, Comment, Mineral 
Rights: The Requirement of Consent Among Co-owners, 48 LA. L. REV. 931 
(1988). 
 3. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 797 (2008). 
 4. Id. art. 480 (2010). 
 5. Id. art. 479. For the definition of both a natural person and a juridical 
person, see id. art. 24 (1999). 
 6. Id. art. 462 (2010). 
 7. “Corporeals are things that have a body, whether animate or inanimate, 
and can be felt or touched.” Id. art. 461. 
 8. “When a person, at his decease, leaves several heirs, each of them 
becomes an undivided proprietor of the effects of the succession, for the part or 
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(after which, “[e]ach spouse owns an undivided one-half interest in 
former community property”9 prior to partition). Co-ownership 
might also result from a legal entity’s liquidation or dissolution and 
the concomitant distribution of the assets to the former 
shareholders,10 partners,11 or members.12  
Although “[o]wnership of land does not include ownership of 
oil, gas, and other minerals occurring naturally in liquid or gaseous 
form, . . . [t]he landowner has the exclusive right to explore and 
develop his property for the production of such minerals and to 
reduce them to possession and ownership.”13 
The right to conduct oil and gas operations on land is typically 
created by either a mineral lease14 or a mineral servitude.15 Each of 
those mineral rights16 confers the right to operate on the burdened 
land.17 
Additionally, “[m]ineral rights are susceptible of ownership in 
indivision.”18 When co-ownership of a mineral right exists, “use or 
possession of a mineral right inures to the benefit of all co-owners 
of the right.”19 Indeed, “use of a mineral servitude must be by the 
                                                                                                             
 
portion coming to him, which forms among the heirs a community of property, 
as long as it remains undivided.” Id. art. 1292 (2000). 
 9. Id. art. 2369.2 (2009). 
 10. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:141–149 (2010). 
 11. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2833 (2005). 
 12. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1337(A). 
 13. Id. § 31:6 (2000). 
 14. “A mineral lease is a contract by which the lessee is granted the right to 
explore for and produce minerals. A single lease may be created on two or more 
noncontiguous tracts of land . . . .” Id. § 31:114. 
 15. See Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling’s Heirs, 91 So. 207 (La. 
1922); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:21. 
 16. “The basic mineral rights that may be created by a landowner are the 
mineral servitude, the mineral royalty, and the mineral lease.” LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 31:16. 
 17. While a mineral royalty is also a mineral right that is susceptible of 
ownership in indivision, a mineral royalty is a passive interest that confers on its 
owner neither an executive right “nor . . . the right to conduct operations to 
explore for or produce minerals.” Id. § 31:81. Although a mineral royalty created 
by a co-owner of land is beyond the scope of this Article (because it does not 
confer the right to operate), it is noted en passant that, pursuant to Louisiana 
Revised Statutes section 31:165, a “co-owner of land may create a mineral 
royalty out of his undivided interest in the land,” and the “consent of the co-
owner of the party creating the royalty right is not necessary to entitle the 
royalty owner to receive his proportionate part of production.” Id. § 31:165. 
 18. Id. § 31:168. 
 19. Id. § 31:174. See Lowry v. MRT Exploration Co., 382 So. 2d 1034, 
1036 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (“The drilling activities conducted on the property by 
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owner of the servitude, his representative or employee, or some 
other person acting on his behalf,”20 with the further instruction 
that a “person is acting on behalf of the servitude owner only when 
there is a legal relationship between him and the servitude owner, 
such as co-ownership or agency.”21 
The Civil Code states that “[a] co-owner may freely lease, 
alienate, or encumber his share of the thing held in indivision.”22 
However, at general law, the “consent of all the co-owners is 
required for the lease, alienation, or encumbrance of the entire 
thing held in indivision.”23 As article 2 of the Louisiana Mineral 
Code recognizes,24 this statement of general law would yield to the 
specific provisions of the Louisiana Mineral Code pertaining to co-
ownership of mineral rights or land. 
While this Article examines the current state of the law on this 
important topic, it is necessary to consider the law of Louisiana 
concerning the rights and duties of co-owners generally, as well as 
the law pertaining to oil and gas operations, both prior to the 
enactment in 1975 of the Louisiana Mineral Code and then as a 
result of significant amendments to that Code in 1986 and in 1988. 
II. RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF CO-OWNERS GENERALLY 
A. Introduction 
Each co-owner has the right to possess and to enjoy the whole 
of the thing co-owned, in accordance with its destination (or 
consistently with its nature), coextensively with all other co-
owners.25 As noted by Professor Thomas A. Harrell: 
Each coowner has an equal and correlative right to 
personally occupy and use all of the property without regard 
to the extent of his fractional interest if his activities are 
                                                                                                             
 
Smackover [the lessee of a co-owner] within ten years from the creation of this 
servitude interrupted prescription as to all co-owners.”). 
 20. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:42. 
 21. Id. § 31:43. 
 22. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 805 (2008). 
 23. Id. 
 24. “The provisions of this Code are supplementary to those of the 
Louisiana Civil Code and are applicable specifically to the subject matter of 
mineral law. In the event of conflict between the provisions of this Code and 
those of the Civil Code or other laws the provisions of this Code shall prevail. If 
this Code does not expressly or impliedly provide for a particular situation, the 
Civil Code or other laws are applicable.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:2. 
 25. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 802. 
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consistent with the destination of the property. He cannot be 
charged by his coowners for such use. . . . The courts will not 
regulate the ordinary use of the property by several 
coowners, nor arbitrate disputes among them as to such 
matters. The remedy of the coowners is to partition the 
property if they cannot agree upon how the property is to be 
used.26 
While the right of each co-owner of a thing to possession 
thereof is equal and coextensive, it is also the long-recognized and 
well-settled law in Louisiana that one co-owner in possession of 
the thing cannot be evicted from such possession by another co-
owner.27 Rather, the remedy of the nonpossessory co-owner is in 
the nature of an action for partition and–or for accounting of any 
rents, fruits, or products that the possessory co-owner derives from 
the thing.28 
B. Partition Is the Remedy Available to the Unhappy Co-owner 
The case of Juneau v. Laborde29 presented the situation 
wherein certain co-owners of land sued another co-owner who had 
taken possession of the property and cultivated cotton for 14 years. 
The plaintiffs sought “to recover the value of rents, revenues, use 
and enjoyment.”30 Although the court stated that the defendant 
“was never a trespasser but a co-owner of the property with 
plaintiffs,”31 he was not liable for rent because, “[as] a co-owner of 
the property[,] [he] was entitled, as such, to occupy it without 
becoming liable to plaintiffs for rent.”32 The defendant was ordered 
to “account to his co-owner for all rents and revenues he has 
received because, in obtaining these fruits, he acts not only for 
himself but also as the agent of his co-owner for the latter’s just 
proportion.”33 The court noted that the “remedy of the co-owner 
out of possession is . . . by suit for a partition and settlement of 
accounts, or for a division of profits.”34 
                                                                                                             
 26. See Harrell, supra note 2, at 386–87 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 27. Spencer v. Spencer, 273 So. 2d 605, 607 (La. Ct. App. 1973). 
 28. Moreira v. Schwan, 37 So. 542 (La. 1904). 
 29. 82 So. 2d 693 (La. 1955). 
 30. Id. at 695. 
 31. Id. See also Pettus v. Atchafalaya Wildlife Protective Soc’y, 351 So. 2d 
790 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (“A lessee who possesses through his lessor is not a 
trespasser.”). 
 32. Juneau, 82 So. 2d at 695. 
 33. Id. (citations omitted). 
 34. Id. at 696. 
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The defendant in Coon v. Miller35 was the surviving spouse of 
a decedent whose estate the plaintiff was administering. The 
succession administrator sued the defendant spouse, challenging 
her right to continue to use and occupy the family home, which 
was a portion of the former community. The plaintiff sought the 
eviction of the defendant under a claimed implied lease, as well as 
a judgment for unpaid rent.36 The surviving spouse argued that she 
occupied the premises under her rights as co-owner, not under any 
lease.37  
The court held that the defendant, as co-owner, had the right to 
possess the property coextensively with any other co-owner and, 
further, that as a co-owner in possession, could not be evicted.38 
Furthermore, the proper remedy available to the administrator was 
an action for partition.39  
Interestingly, the court stated the following with respect to the 
administrator’s claim that the occupancy of the surviving spouse 
should be viewed as that of a lessee who had not paid rent: 
If this action should be considered as a proceeding against a 
lessee or tenant of property liable for unpaid rent, it would 
seem clear that plaintiff would be entitled both to the 
remedy of eviction and to possession of the premises, and 
that the present suit would be authorized under the 
provisions of LSA-C.C.P. Title 11, Article 4701, et seq., 
relating to the ejectment of tenants and occupants. 
 
However, the instant case does not justify the application 
and the enforcement of the codal provisions above noted. 
The record does not contain evidence of any nature of lease 
or agreement of rent between the parties, either express or 
implied. Despite the fact that plaintiff is a judgment 
creditor for an amount representing unpaid rent, this 
judgment in itself is not sufficient to sustain the contention 
that defendant’s right of occupancy derives from any 
agreement of lease or rental.40 
The unique relationship between co-owners is fraught with the 
opportunity for passive tension, if not outright aggressive hostility. 
Even when the co-owners’ shares are equal, human nature informs 
                                                                                                             
 35. 175 So. 2d 385 (La. Ct. App. 1965).  
 36. See id. at 386. 
 37. See id. 
 38. Id. at 386–87. 
 39. Id. at 387. 
 40. Id. at 386. 
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us that at least one co-owner always seems to take pleasure in 
exercising his or her rights of co-ownership solely for the purpose 
of being disagreeable with respect to the desire of another co-
owner to take a certain action with regard to the commonly held 
thing (e.g., land).41 
As cogently expressed by the ancient Roman commentators, 
the foundational rule was that “one of the co-owners of a thing in 
common can do nothing (in re) in or concerning the thing (invito 
altero) against the will of, or in opposition to, the other.”42 When 
the issue was presented to the Louisiana Supreme Court, this rule 
naturally led to the conclusion that a “co-owner may . . . oppose 
any attempt by his co-owners, or by a lessee of his co-owner, to 
exploit the common property for oil and gas.”43 
As a natural consequence of the rule that co-owners of land 
“are owners par mi et par tout, of part and of the whole,”44 the 
only reasonable remedy available to a disagreeable co-owner is 
partition.45 So powerful was this rule that the courts have 
characterized the right of a co-owner to demand a partition as 
“favored.”46 
C. Jurisprudential Treatment of the Right of a Co-owner to Grant 
a Mineral Lease on Its Undivided Interest in the Co-owned Land 
As will be seen,47 the Louisiana Mineral Code now requires the 
consent of a certain threshold of owners before exploration and 
production (E&P) operations48 may be conducted on co-owned 
land (either pursuant to a mineral servitude or a mineral lease) or 
on land burdened by a co-owned mineral servitude. The full effect 
and legal import of these codal provisions may be fully appreciated 
only if they are considered in light of the law of co-ownership, 
                                                                                                             
 41. Perhaps Rodney King was prescient when he asked, “Can’t we all just 
get along?” 
 42. Gulf Refining Co. of La. v. Carroll, 82 So. 277, 278 (La. 1919) (citing 
DIG. 10.3.28 (Papinian, Quaestionums 7)).  
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. (alteration in original).  
 45. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 807 (2008). 
 46. Campbell v. Pasternack Holding Co., Inc., 625 So. 2d 477, 480 (La. 1993) 
(stating that “partition is favored under Louisiana law and this Court’s 
jurisprudence” and further that the “need to partition stems from the 
inconvenience of co-management, namely the requirement of unanimous consent 
of co-owners in managing commonly held property”). 
 47. See discussion infra Part III. 
 48. E&P operations are physical activities conducted in connection with the 
drilling of a well in pursuit of exploration for and production of oil, gas, or other 
minerals. But see discussion infra Part XII. 
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which historically prevailed in Louisiana prior to the adoption of 
the Louisiana Mineral Code in 1975 and before the amendments to 
that Code in 1986 and 1988. 
Prior to 1986, a mineral lessee was required to obtain the 
consent of all co-owners of a co-owned tract of land before it could 
operate on the leased premises. This proposition was announced in 
the seminal case of Gulf Refining Company of Louisiana v. 
Carroll,49 where the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the right of a 
recalcitrant co-owner to oppose the conduct of mineral operations 
by a lessee of a consenting co-owner.  
The plaintiff held a mineral lease granted by the owner of an 
undivided one-half interest in a tract of land.50 The other co-owner 
did not consent to the lease.51 The lessee sought to establish its 
“right, supposedly derived from the lease in question, to go upon 
the land in question to exploit it for oil and gas.”52 The court stated 
as follows: 
Now the owner of an undivided half of a tract of land has not 
the right to exploit the land for oil and gas without the 
consent, implied or express, of his co-owner, and not having 
this right himself he cannot confer it upon a lessee; and the 
plaintiff company has not alleged that it has the consent, 
implied or express, of [the other co-owner] for going upon 
this land to exploit it for oil and gas. . . . 
 
A co-owner may therefore oppose any attempt by his co-
owners, or by a lessee of his co-owner, to exploit the 
common property for oil and gas. . . . 
 
From this source53 has been derived the maxims, “In re 
communi melior est conditio prohibentis”—a maxim 
meaning, “In common property the condition of the one 
prohibiting is the better,”—and “In re communi neminem 
dominorum jure facere quicquam, invito altero, posse,” a 
maxim meaning “One coproprietor can exercise no authority 
over the common property against the will of the other.” Or 
as the same maxim is more tersely expressed “Melior est 
prohibentis.” In other words, either coowner has a right of 
veto against the acts of the other. And it is that very legal 
situation which underlies the principle that no one can be 
                                                                                                             
 49. See Carroll, 82 So. 277. 
 50. Id. at 278. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. The court is referring to Sabinus, who is quoted previously in the case. 
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compelled to remain in indivision; that any co-owner may 
at any time demand a partition. . . . 
 
By all this is not meant that the lease is not valid as 
between the lessor and the lessee, nor that one may not 
validly lease property belonging to another, but what is 
meant is that such a lease is null in so far as the co-owner is 
concerned; on the same principle that the lease of the 
property of another, while valid as between the parties to 
the lease, is null in so far as this other is concerned. The 
idea is simply that neither one of the co-owners has any 
right to any particular part of the common estate, or to do 
anything upon it, to the exclusion of his coowner.54 
The court in Carroll cited Gulf Refining Company of Louisiana 
v. Hayne.55 In that case, and as explained in subsequent litigation 
between those parties,56 Hayne granted a mineral lease to Gulf 
Refining Company (Gulf). After examining title, Gulf determined 
that Hayne only owned an undivided one-third interest in the 
land.57 Gulf called upon its lessor to rectify the situation by having 
the co-owners ratify the lease.58 Upon Hayne’s failure to do so, 
Gulf sued “for a partition of the land in order that his interest in it 
might be segregated and the rights conferred by the lease exercised 
upon that interest.”59 The suit failed because a mineral lessee had 
no standing to demand a partition of the land leased.60 
Judicial proceedings taken in the Hayne case after the denial of 
the right of partition are also instructive.61 Subsequent to the first 
opinion, Gulf went onto the property to operate and was met with 
                                                                                                             
 54. Carroll, 82 So. at 278–80. 
 55. 70 So. 509 (La. 1916). 
 56. Gulf Refining Co. of La. v. Hayne, 86 So. 891 (La. 1920). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 891–92. 
 60. Id. at 892 (citing Hayne, 70 So. 509). See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
31:169 (2000) (“Co-ownership does not exist between the owner of a mineral 
right and the owner of the land subject to the right or between the owners of 
separate mineral rights.”). But see Lacassane Co., Inc. v. Jardin Minerals Co., 
847 So. 2d 704, 705 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that an owner of a distinct 
mineral servitude granted by fewer than all co-owners could force a partition 
with the owner of a different, discrete mineral servitude granted by fewer than 
all of the co-owners because they commonly held “the right to explore for, 
develop and reduce to possession” the minerals under the co-owned land). 
 61. Hayne, 86 So. 891. 
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an injunction by the nonsignatory co-owners.62 The injunction 
issued and was still in force.63 
Under the mineral lease from Hayne, “operations had to begin 
within 12 months” from its date.64 After that period elapsed, Hayne 
and his co-owners drilled a well that was successful.65 Gulf sued 
for its net revenue share of the product, contending that 
the delay for beginning operations could not run while the 
plaintiff company was prevented by the injunction from 
acting; and that consequently the lease has continued in full 
force; that it has divested Hayne of all right he had to the 
oil under the land, and of all right he had to operate for 
same, and has vested these rights fully and completely in 
plaintiff; and that therefore plaintiff is entitled to have the 
oil produced by said well, and to stand in the place of 
Hayne with reference to said well.66 
Hayne defended by saying that he was not a party to the 
injunction suit and that “it was by no act of his that the plaintiff 
company was prevented from operating.”67 The court stated that 
this argument would be sound “if the defendant Hayne had not 
been under obligation by his contract of lease to cause plaintiff 
company to have possession of the land, and the want of this 
possession had not been the sole reason of the plaintiff company’s 
not operating.”68 
Finding the defendant lessor to be “at fault,” the court then 
stated that “to allow him to take advantage of the expiration of the 
delay in question would be to allow him to take advantage of his 
own fault.”69 Thus, the court found that Gulf was entitled to its net 
revenue share of production under its lease with Hayne.70 
The second Hayne decision says a great deal about the 
character of a mineral lease granted by less than all of the co-
owners, as well as the lessor’s obligation to deliver the leased 
premises to the lessee.71 While the lessee under such a lease could 
                                                                                                             
 62. Id. at 892. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See id. at 892–93. 
 71. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:119 (2000) (“A mineral lessor is bound to 
deliver the premises that he has leased for use by the lessee, to refrain from 
disturbing the lessee’s possession, and to perform the contract in good faith.”). 
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not––prior to 1986––operate without the consent of all other co-
owners, it is otherwise a valid lease entitling its owner to its 
stipulated share of revenue when brought about by the efforts of 
others. 
The issue was next visited in United Gas Public Service 
Company v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Company.72 In that case, 
the defendant acquired an oil and gas lease from F. E. Gloyd and 
began drilling operations.73 Subsequently, the plaintiff acquired a 
7/40 interest in the same property and filed suit to enjoin the 
defendant from continuing the drilling operations.74 The trial court 
refused to issue the injunction, and the plaintiff appealed.75 
On original hearing, the Louisiana Supreme Court relied on the 
Louisiana jurisprudence and civil law doctrine that without the 
other co-owner’s consent, a co-owner may “oppose any attempt by 
his co-owner, or by lessee of his co-owner, to exploit the common 
property for oil or gas (or other minerals), a doctrine ‘as old as the 
Roman Law.’”76 Thus, the court held that an injunction was the 
proper remedy in that case and the defendant’s course of action 
was to institute a partition proceeding.77  
On rehearing, the court found that granting an injunction might 
cause irreparable damage to the defendant and, at the same time, 
prevent the use of the property for gas-drilling operations.78 
Carroll was distinguished on the stated basis that it was not shown 
“that the land involved was proven oil or gas land nor that it was 
being drained and destroyed by adjacent wells,” and, further, that 
“the titles of the landowners” were disputed.79  
                                                                                                             
 72. 147 So. 66 (La. 1933). 
 73. Id. at 68 (on rehearing). 
 74. Id. at 67 (on original hearing). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. The court noted this position to be contrary to the common law 
doctrine that would have permitted a cotenant to conduct drilling operations 
without obtaining the consent of the other cotenants. Id. (citing LAWRENCE MILLS 
& J. C. WILLINGHAM, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 177, at 265 (1926)). See, e.g., 
Byrom v. Pendley, 717 S.W.2d 602, 605 (Tex. 1986) (“It has long been the rule in 
Texas that a cotenant has the right to extract minerals from common property 
without first obtaining the consent of his cotenants; however, he must account to 
them on the basis of the value of any minerals taken, less the necessary and 
reasonable costs of production and marketing. The rule announced in Burnham 
and reaffirmed in Cox is founded on the distinctive legal relationship existing 
between cotenants; that is, each cotenant has a right to enter upon the common 
estate and a corollary right to possession.” (citing Cox v. Davison, 397 S.W.2d 
200, 201 (Tex. 1965); Burnham v. Hardy Oil Co., 147 S.W. 330, 334–35 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1912), aff’d on other grounds, 195 S.W. 1139 (Tex. 1917))). 
 77. United Gas Pub. Serv. Co., 147 So. at 67. 
 78. Id. at 69 (on rehearing). 
 79. Id. 
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The court observed that, as a co-owner, the plaintiff would not 
be damaged by defendant’s drilling operations if no gas were 
found.80 On the other hand, if gas were found, the plaintiff would 
be compensated financially for the value of the gas.81 
Consequently, the court held that a co-owner could not prevent 
drilling operations on property owned in indivision and refused to 
issue the injunction.82 The co-owner could recover any damages 
from the drilling operations by receiving his share of the revenues 
from gas produced on the property.83 
Professor Harriet Spiller Daggett, in her significant work on 
mineral rights, lamented that the supreme court, on rehearing in 
this case, was seemingly “influenced . . . to some extent” by “the 
line of common-law authorities” cited in the original opinion.84 
Professor Daggett stated further that the “evidence inclines toward 
a just decision, but the violence to the flat doctrine must be 
observed for future need as it makes the question a factual one.”85 
In Amerada Petroleum Corporation v. Murphy,86 the plaintiff 
sought to cancel two mineral leases granted by some, but not all, of 
the co-owners of a tract of land.87 The plaintiff argued that a 
partition sale of the property had extinguished the leases.88 The 
lessee contended that the partition sale was null and void because it 
failed to comply with Act No. 336 of 1940 (the Act).89 The Act 
required both that he be made a party to the sale and that his lease 
be separately appraised.90 The evidence showed that although the 
partition judgment was rendered prior to the effective date of the 
Act, the writ ordering the sale, the advertisement of the sale, and 
the sale itself all occurred subsequent to the passage of the Act.91 
The court held that because the Act did not contain any 
declaration that it was to have retroactive effect and because the 
act created substantive rights and did not deal with matters of 
procedure, the partition sale was valid even though it failed to 
comport with the Act.92 Because the partition sale was valid, the 
                                                                                                             
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See id. 
 83. See id. 
 84. HARRIET SPILLER DAGGETT, MINERAL RIGHTS IN LOUISIANA § 46, at 153 
(1939). 
 85. Id. 
 86. 16 So. 2d 244 (La. 1943). 
 87. Id. at 244. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 245. 
 90. See id. 
 91. Id. at 245–46. 
 92. Id. at 246. 
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court ordered that the inscription of the lease should be cancelled 
and erased from the public records.93 
The Louisiana Supreme Court provided further commentary on 
the nature of the relationship between co-owners in a case 
challenging a statute that authorized the State Mineral Board to 
grant a mineral lease on lands owned by a large number of co-
owners. Prior to their repeal in 1960,94 Louisiana Revised Statutes 
sections 30:181–185 provided a procedure whereby the State 
Mineral Board95 could be requested to grant a mineral lease on 
land “owned in indivision by five hundred or more persons.” The 
constitutionality of Act No. 513 of 1952 (codified as Louisiana 
Revised Statutes sections 30:181–188) was challenged in Sun Oil 
Company v. State Mineral Board.96  
One of the co-owners, Belle Isle Corporation,97 granted a 
mineral lease on its lands to Sun Oil Company.98 After the lease 
was granted, a group of co-owners applied to the State Mineral 
Board pursuant to the statute, seeking to have a lease granted on 
behalf of the land’s co-owners.99 Both the lessor and the lessee 
under the first mineral lease brought this suit, “charg[ing] that such 
leasing by the Board would be violative of various provisions of 
the Federal and Louisiana Constitutions, including the due process 
and equal protection clauses and the prohibitions against ex post 
facto laws and laws impairing the obligation of contracts.”100 
The trial court held that the Act was unconstitutional, but the 
supreme court reversed, upholding its constitutionality.101 In its 
original decision, the court cited the Amerada decision for the 
proposition that a lease granted by less than all of the co-owners 
“is null insofar as the other co-owners are concerned” and noted 
that “a co-owner may oppose any attempt by his co-owners, or by 
a lessee of his co-owners, to exploit the common property for oil 
and gas.”102 
                                                                                                             
 93. See id. at 245, 246. 
 94. Act No. 358, 1960 La. Acts 739. Inexplicably, the repealing legislation 
did not repeal Louisiana Revised Statutes sections 30:186–188. 
 95. Now called the State Mineral and Energy Board. See Act No. 196, 2009 
La. Acts 1981. 
 96. 92 So. 2d 583 (La. 1956). 
 97. Stated in the opinion to be the “[o]wner of an undivided 13/144 plus an 
undivided 423/864 of an .045798 interest in the land.” Id. at 586. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 584–85. 
 100. Id. at 585. 
 101. Id. at 585, 588–89. 
 102. Id. at 586 (footnote omitted) (citing Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. Reese, 
196 So. 558 (La. 1940); Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. Murphy, 16 So. 2d 244 (La. 
1943)). 
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The court then cited Carroll for the proposition that “as between 
the parties, the lease of mineral interests owned in indivision with 
others is valid since one may validly lease property belonging to 
another.”103 The court then noted: 
However, it is well established in the cited cases and in the 
many authorities following them that such a lease is null 
insofar as the other co-owners are concerned and a co-
owner may oppose any attempt by his co-owners, or by a 
lessee of his co-owners, to exploit the common property for 
oil and gas, the theory being that co-owners are owners par 
mi et par tout, of part and of the whole, and no co-owner 
has the exclusive right to any determinate part of the 
common property.104 
Commenting further on such a mineral lease, the court stated: 
The most accurate description of co-plaintiffs’ lease is that 
it was an executory contract dependent for its operation 
upon a suspensive condition, viz., that Sun Oil Company, 
as lessee, obtain leases or at least acquiescence from every 
other co-owner of the land in question. Neither the leases 
nor the consent have ever been procured and it is clear that 
no obligation has ever come into being.105 
Rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that the statute “operates as a 
divestiture of vested rights,” the court stated: 
The lease in question vests no rights in either party since it 
confers neither rights nor obligations until the happening of 
the suspensive condition previously discussed for, as above 
stated, prior to this time Belle Isle Corporation could not 
deliver possession of the premises and Sun Oil Company is 
precluded from going on the land to explore for minerals.106 
It is one thing to say that the lessee under a mineral lease granted 
by less than all co-owners of land has no right to operate on the 
described lands without the consent of all other co-owners. 
However, to say that such a lease (irrespective of the issue of the 
right to operate) is of no force or effect—that it “vests no rights in 
either party since it confers neither rights nor obligations until the 
                                                                                                             
 103. Id. (citations omitted) (citing Gulf Refining Co. of La. v. Carroll, 82 So. 
277 (La. 1919)). 
 104. Id. (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). 
 105. Id. at 586–87 (footnote omitted). 
 106. Id. at 587 (citing Gulf Refining Co. of La. v. Carroll, 82 So. 277 (La. 
1919)). 
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happening of the suspensive condition previously discussed”—
overstates the proposition a bit.107 
Application was made for a rehearing, which was disposed of, as 
follows: 
In briefs filed on application for rehearing issue was taken 
to certain statements in our opinion in this case concerning 
vested rights, impairment of the obligation of contracts, and 
the validity of the lease between Belle Isle and Sun Oil. 
 
Upon further consideration we have decided that a 
discussion of these issues is unnecessary to a decision in this 
case, and we now prefer to rest our decision solely on the 
basis that Act 513 of 1952 is constitutional because it is a 
valid exercise by the state of its police power.108 
Contrary to the statement that was withdrawn on rehearing, the 
proposition was more accurately stated in Acree v. Shell Oil 
Company: 
A mineral lease from a co-owner does not create a mere 
personal obligation in the “lessor” to deliver an interest in 
land should the lessor ever acquire title to it. Such a lease 
confers a valid mineral right. The exercise of the right is 
merely suspended pending the consent of the other co-
owners.109 
A consequence of a mineral lease granted by less than all co-
owners not being per se invalid is that “it may not be stricken from 
the public records.”110 While the fact that such a mineral lease 
“may not be stricken from the public records” certainly says 
something about its legal character or efficacy, still, the mere 
recordation of an instrument does not give it any effect that cannot 
be ascribed to it by general law. Thus, as it is stated in current law, 
the “recordation of an instrument . . . [d]oes not create a 
presumption that the instrument is valid or genuine.”111 
                                                                                                             
 107. Id. (emphasis added). See also infra Part XIII. 
 108. Sun Oil Co., 92 So. 2d at 588–89 (per curiam) (denying application for 
rehearing). 
 109. 548 F. Supp. 1150, 1156 (M.D. La. 1982) (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
31:166 (2000); id. § 31:166 cmt.), aff’d, 721 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1984). 
 110. Ree Corp. v. Shaffer, 246 So. 2d 313, 322 (La. Ct. App. 1971), aff’d, 
260 So. 2d 307 (La. 1972). 
 111. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3341(1) (2007). 
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D. Jurisprudential Treatment of the Right of a Co-owner to Grant 
a Mineral Servitude on Its Undivided Interest in the Co-owned 
Land 
An early case involved the purchase of a mineral servitude 
interest from a co-owner of the land.112 The servitude owner 
contended that the right of the other co-owners to withhold their 
consent, thereby prohibiting any drilling by the mineral purchaser, 
constituted an obstacle, which suspended the prescription running 
against the purchaser’s mineral servitude.113  
The court held that such right of the other co-owners of the 
land was not sufficient to constitute an obstacle114 within the 
meaning of article 792 of the Louisiana Civil Code115 because the 
mineral purchaser could remove the obstacle by suing for a 
partition of the land under article 740,116 in which case his mineral 
interest would attach to the portion of the land assigned to his 
vendor.117 The court stated that the obstacle doctrine applies “to 
those obstacles only which the owner of the servitude or real right 
has not consented to.”118 
III. ENTER THE LOUISIANA MINERAL CODE 
A. Preface 
Without regard to the opportunity for abuse, the law prior to 
1986 was clear: The owner of a minute, undivided interest in a 
tract of land could, absent his or her consent, object and thereby 
prevent E&P operations. This absolute right of recalcitrance 
existed despite the fact that the balance––or even the vast 
majority––of the remaining co-owners desired that such operations 
be conducted. 
                                                                                                             
 112. Hightower v. Maritzky, 195 So. 518 (La. 1940). 
 113. Id. at 520–21. 
 114. See id. 
 115. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 755 (2008) (“If the owner of the dominant 
estate is prevented from using the servitude by an obstacle that he can neither 
prevent nor remove, the prescription of nonuse is suspended on that account for 
a period of up to ten years.”). 
 116. See id. art. 717 (“If the estate owned in indivision is partitioned in kind, 
the servitude established by a co-owner on his undivided part burdens only the 
part allotted to him.”). 
 117. This would no longer be good law because the “[o]wner of a mineral 
right acquired from a co-owner of land cannot compel partition of the land.” LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:167 (2000). 
 118. Hightower, 195 So. at 520. 
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As a practical matter, this circumstance––this opportunity for 
recalcitrance––resulted in the nonconsenting co-owner enjoying 
greater “bargaining power” to secure from the lessee (or other 
party desiring to operate) better terms or a higher bonus, rental, or 
royalty than his co-owners who had already leased. In the mind of 
the lessee, the term highway robbery or extortion came to mind. 
If that last consenting co-owner should have received better 
terms, the other previously committed co-owners, who rightfully 
felt that they were being penalized for leasing earlier, might 
understandably be dissatisfied. The “holdout” might be said to 
have been rewarded for his recalcitrance while the earlier signing 
lessors felt that they were being disadvantaged for having been 
cooperative with the lessee and receiving lesser terms. Suffice it to 
say, this did not lead to happy family reunions—“All in the 
Family,” indeed.119 
As originally adopted in 1975,120 the Louisiana Mineral Code 
was totally consistent with then-prevailing law pertinent to co-
owners. At that time, the consent of all co-owners was necessary 
for one co-owner (or the lessee of a co-owner) to operate on the 
co-owned land or co-owned mineral servitude. 
Because it meant that the single owner of a very small, 
undivided interest in the land could prevent operations, which the 
vast majority of the co-owners desired, this high level of consent 
proved untenable.121 The Louisiana Legislature undertook to 
rectify this situation, first in 1986, then in 1988. 
As will be seen, three articles of the Louisiana Mineral Code 
come into play in considering these issues. They address the 
following aspects of co-ownership, to-wit: 
(a) Article 164 regulates the creation of a mineral servitude by 
a co-owner of land; 
(b) Article 166 addresses the granting of a mineral lease by a 
co-owner of land; and 
(c) Article 175 concerns the rights of co-owners of a mineral 
servitude to operate on the land. 
                                                                                                             
 119. A lessor who leases early might protect itself by insisting upon a “most 
favored nations” clause under which the lessee is obligated to extend or pay to 
those lessors who signed earlier at lesser terms or considerations, the greater or 
better terms or considerations if paid by the lessee to a lessor who subsequently 
signs a mineral lease. Courts have enforced clauses of this type, resulting in 
significant damage awards. See, e.g., Stephenson v. Petrohawk Props., L.P., 37 
So. 3d 1145 (La. Ct. App. 2010) (awarding $1,920,000); Hoover Tree Farm, 
L.L.C. v. Goodrich Petroleum Co., L.L.C., 63 So. 3d 159 (La. Ct. App. 2011) 
(awarding $7.6 million), cert. denied, 69 So. 3d 1161–62 (La. 2011). 
 120. Act. No. 50, 1974 La. Acts 237 (effective January 1, 1975). 
 121. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:164 cmt. 
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These three articles are examined in Parts IV, V, and VI hereof, 
respectively. 
B. Amendments in 1986 
With the foregoing historical perspective in mind, in 1986, the 
Louisiana Legislature amended several of the co-ownership articles 
of the Louisiana Mineral Code. These included articles 164, 166, 
and 175.122  
As amended at that time, the relevant articles permitted the 
conduct of E&P operations by the party desiring to operate who 
obtained the consent from less than all of the co-owners, provided 
that at least 90% of the co-owners had expressed their consent to 
such operations. In this manner, a minority of co-owners owning, 
in the aggregate, less than a 10% interest in the land or servitude 
could not frustrate the will of the great majority. 
This amendment’s rationale was explained in the Comment to 
the 1986 Amendment under article 164 of the Louisiana Mineral 
Code, as follows: 
The 1986 amendments to Articles [sic] 164, 166, and 175 
continue to preserve the principle in the Mineral Code that 
one co-owner may not conduct operations without the consent 
of his co-owner, but limit this principle so that a small 
minority of co-owners cannot prevent mineral operations 
desired by other owners of rights in the land or mineral 
rights. . . . 
  
These amendments are intended to be read broadly in favor 
of allowing the majority of owners to develop where they so 
desire. Thus the ninety percent is to be calculated such that it 
includes the interest of the owner seeking to gain the consent 
of the others.123 
C. Amendments in 1988 
In 1988, the 90% threshold introduced in 1986 was lowered to 
80%.124 These amendments—as the commentary noted above 
explains—clearly and unambiguously evince the Louisiana 
Legislature’s intent to permit the conduct of oil and gas operations 
by an operator to whom not less than 80% of the co-owners (of co-
                                                                                                             
 122. Act No. 1047, 1986 La. Acts 1964. 
 123. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:164 cmt. (emphasis added). 
 124. Act No. 647, 1988 La. Acts 1686. 
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owned land or of a co-owned mineral servitude, as the case may be) 
have granted consent.  
IV. CREATION OF A MINERAL SERVITUDE BY A CO-OWNER OF LAND 
A. Article 164, Louisiana Mineral Code 
Article 164 addresses the creation of a mineral servitude by a 
co-owner of land. It reads as follows: 
A co-owner of land may create a mineral servitude out of 
his undivided interest in the land, and prescription 
commences from the date of its creation. One who acquires 
a mineral servitude from a co-owner of land may not 
exercise his right without the consent of co-owners owning 
at least an undivided eighty percent interest in the land, 
provided that he has made every effort to contact such co-
owners and, if contacted, has offered to contract with them 
on substantially the same basis that he has contracted with 
another co-owner. A co-owner of the land who does not 
consent to the exercise of such rights has no liability for the 
costs of development and operations, except out of his 
share of production.125 
B. How It Works 
Although a mineral servitude indisputably confers upon its 
owner the right to operate on the land,126 one who acquires a 
mineral servitude from a co-owner of land may not exercise such 
right without the consent of co-owners of the land owning at least 
an undivided 80% interest in the land. Inasmuch as a co-owner of 
land must obtain the requisite consent of its co-owners, a person 
whose rights arise under a co-owner—such as a mineral servitude 
owner or a mineral lessee—may not operate on the land until that 
level of consent is obtained.127 
Rather, the party desiring to operate must demonstrate that he 
has made every effort to contact such yet-to-have-consented co-
                                                                                                             
 125. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:164. 
 126. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:21. 
 127. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling’s Heirs, 91 So. 207, 245 (La. 
1922) (“[N]o one can convey to another any greater right than he himself has.”); 
Herlitz Constr. Co., Inc. v. Matherne, 476 So. 2d 1037 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (“An 
assignee acquires no greater rights than its assignor.”); Town of Homer v. 
United Healthcare of La., Inc., 948 So. 2d 1163, 1169 (La. Ct. App. 2007); (“An 
assignor cannot assign any rights greater than that which he held.”). 
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owners and, if contacted, has offered to contract with them on 
substantially the same basis that he has contracted with another co-
owner.128 
A co-owner of the land who does not consent to the exercise of 
such rights has no liability for the costs of development and 
operations, except out of his share of production.129  
V. GRANTING OF A MINERAL LEASE BY A CO-OWNER OF LAND 
A. Article 166, Louisiana Mineral Code 
Similar to article 164, article 166 concerns the granting of a 
mineral lease by a co-owner of land. That article provides as 
follows: 
A co-owner of land may grant a valid mineral lease . . . as 
to his undivided interest in the land but the lessee . . . may 
not exercise his rights thereunder without consent of co-
owners owning at least an undivided eighty percent interest 
in the land, provided that he has made every effort to 
contact such co-owners and, if contacted, has offered to 
contract with them on substantially the same basis that he 
has contracted with another co-owner. A co-owner of the 
land who does not consent to the exercise of such rights has 
no liability for the costs of development and operations or 
other costs, except out of his share of production.130 
B. How It Works 
This article works in the same manner as the prior article, but it 
is directed to a mineral lease granted by less than all of the co-
owners of the land. As in the situation regulated by article 164, the 
lessee desiring to conduct E&P activities on the co-owned land 
must first obtain the “consent of co-owners owning at least an 
undivided eighty percent interest in the land” and must satisfy the 
requirements of the proviso. More about that later.131 
                                                                                                             
 128. This feature of the rule pertaining to a nonconsenting co-owner is 
discussed infra in Part X. 
 129. This aspect of the rule pertaining to a nonconsenting co-owner is more 
fully developed infra in Part XI. 
 130. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:166. The omitted text is discussed infra in 
Part XII. That Part considers the granting of consent to conduct seismic or 
geophysical activities, which differ from traditional E&P operations. 
 131. This feature of the rule pertaining to a nonconsenting co-owner is 
discussed infra in Part X.  
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VI. RIGHTS OF CO-OWNERS OF A MINERAL SERVITUDE TO OPERATE 
ON THE LAND 
A. Article 175, Louisiana Mineral Code 
The rights of co-owners of a mineral servitude to operate on 
the land are regulated by article 175, which reads: 
A co-owner of a mineral servitude may not conduct 
operations on the property subject to the servitude without 
the consent of co-owners owning at least an undivided 
eighty percent interest in the servitude, provided that he has 
made every effort to contact such co-owners and, if 
contacted, has offered to contract with them on substantially 
the same basis that he has contracted with another co-owner 
. . . . A co-owner of the servitude who does not consent to 
such operations has no liability for the costs of development 
and operations except out of his share of production.132 
B. How It Works 
As with the two articles previously considered, and except as 
hereinafter provided, no E&P operations may be conducted on land 
burdened by a distinct mineral servitude that is owned in indivision 
unless the requisite level of consent is obtained. There is an 
important difference, however, in the manner in which the level of 
consent is calculated.133 
C. A Limited Exception to the Need for a Requisite Level of 
Consent 
Article 176 of the Louisiana Mineral Code provides an 
exception to the requirement of article 175 that the requisite level 
of consent be obtained before E&P operations can be conducted 
under a co-owned mineral servitude. That article reads as follows: 
A co-owner of a mineral servitude may act to prevent waste 
or the destruction or extinction of the servitude, but he can-
not impose upon his co-owner liability for any costs of 
development or operation or other costs except out of 
production. He may lease or otherwise contract regarding 
                                                                                                             
 132. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:175. The omitted text is discussed infra in 
Part XII. That Part considers the granting of consent to conduct seismic or 
geophysical activities, which differ from traditional E&P operations. 
 133. See infra Part IX. 
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the full ownership of the servitude but must act at all times 
in good faith and as a reasonably prudent mineral servitude 
owner whose interest is not subject to co-ownership.134 
The language in this article “act to prevent waste” refers to the 
possibility that drainage is occurring by reason of the presence of a 
“lease basis” well on an adjacent or nearby tract of land, whereby a 
neighbor exercises its right under the “rule of capture,”135 which is 
draining minerals from under the servitude tract. 
The language “destruction or extinction of the servitude” 
alludes to the potential loss of the mineral servitude by the accrual 
of the prescription of nonuse.136 What is not clear is how a court 
would view the earliest date prior to the accrual of prescription that 
would, in the absence of operations, give rise to the possible 
“destruction or extinction of the servitude” such that a co-owner of 
the servitude may take action to preserve the servitude. A lessee 
under a mineral lease granted pursuant to this article would be 
vitally interested in knowing that the lease has not been granted too 
soon. 
Although the article does not explicitly so state, seemingly, 
these exceptions are only necessary in the absence of compulsory 
unitization affecting or including the servitude tract or a portion 
thereof. To the extent that a compulsory unit includes all or a 
portion of the servitude tract, there is no “waste” because there is 
no drainage of the servitude as such tract would participate in unit 
production.137 By the same token, unit operations or production 
                                                                                                             
 134. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:176. 
 135. The “rule of capture” is codified by three articles of the Louisiana 
Mineral Code. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:6 (“The landowner has the 
exclusive right to explore and develop his property for the production of such 
minerals and to reduce them to possession and ownership.”); id. § 31:8 (“A 
landowner . . . may reduce to possession and ownership all of the minerals 
occurring naturally in a liquid or gaseous state that can be obtained by 
operations on or beneath his land even though his operations may cause their 
migration from beneath the land of another.”); id. § 31:14 (“A landowner has no 
right against another who causes drainage of liquid or gaseous minerals from 
beneath his property if the drainage results from drilling or mining operations on 
other lands.”). 
 136. “A mineral servitude is extinguished by . . . prescription resulting from 
nonuse for ten years.” Id. § 31:27(1). 
 137. “A drilling unit, as contemplated herein, means the maximum area which 
may be efficiently and economically drained by one well. This unit shall constitute 
a developed area as long as a well is located thereon which is capable of producing 
oil or gas in paying quantities.” Id. § 30:9(B) (2007). 
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would maintain the mineral servitude in force and effect to the 
extent that the servitude tract is in the unit.138 
In those instances when the law dispenses with the need to 
obtain the requisite level of consent to prevent “waste” or to avoid 
the “destruction or extinction of the servitude,” the co-owner 
desiring to operate has the power to bind the nonacting co-owners 
to a mineral lease that the acting party chooses to grant, and such 
lease would validly cover “the full ownership of the servitude.” 
The instruction that the co-owner desiring to operate “must act at 
all times in good faith and as a reasonably prudent mineral 
servitude owner whose interest is not subject to co-ownership” is 
concordant with the similar principle as in a mineral lease granted 
by the owner of an executive interest.139 
Although the Louisiana Mineral Code fails to explain the rights 
of a nonacting co-owner who is dissatisfied with the lease’s terms, a 
court would apply by analogy the standards of articles 109 and 
110140 of the Louisiana Mineral Code as the most logical controlling 
principles. The rule announced by the latter article is of great 
importance to the lessee who is willing to incur the significant costs 
to drill the well. A violation of the standard of conduct, while giving 
rise to a personal action by the nonconsenting co-owner against the 
acting co-owner, would not invalidate the mineral lease. 
Also unanswered is the treatment to be given to a mineral lease 
granted to a different lessee by one or more co-owners after another 
co-owner has granted a mineral lease, pursuant to this article, which 
purports to cover and affect “the full ownership of the servitude.” 
Does the “first come, first served” rule operate to deny effect to that 
second lease? Does that subsequent lease essentially become a top 
                                                                                                             
 138. “It is now well established in the jurisprudence of this court that where 
there is a forced unitization, on order of the Commissioner of Conservation, 
commercial production from any part of the unit interrupts the running of 
prescription as to all mineral servitudes within the unit.” White v. Frank B. Treat 
& Son, Inc., 89 So. 2d 883, 884 (La. 1956). See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
31:47 (“When drilling or mining operations or actual production otherwise 
sufficient to interrupt prescription takes place on a compulsory unit including all 
or a part of the land burdened by a mineral servitude, an interruption of 
prescription takes place without formal adoption by the owner of the 
servitude.”). 
 139. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:109 (“The owner of an executive interest is 
not obligated to grant a mineral lease, but in doing so, he must act in good faith 
and in the same manner as a reasonably prudent landowner or mineral servitude 
owner whose interest is not burdened by a nonexecutive interest.”). 
 140. Id. § 31:110 (“A mineral lease granted in violation of the standard of 
conduct required by Article 109 is not invalid for that reason, but the owner of a 
nonexecutive interest may recover any damages sustained by him by a personal 
action against the owner of the executive right. The action prescribes one year 
from the date on which the lease is filed for registry.”). 
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lease141 vis-à-vis the mineral lease granted pursuant to article 175, at 
least with respect to the interest of the lessor signatory to such lease? 
While not explicitly so stated, the placement of this limited 
exception immediately following article 175—coupled with the 
fact that logic would not compel a different conclusion—indicates 
that the limited exception is not available to one whose servitude is 
addressed by article 164. 
D. Scenario Within a Scenario 
The mineral servitude, which is treated by article 175 (by 
reason of the fact that it is a discrete, co-owned mineral servitude), 
might also be subject to article 164 if all co-owners of the land did 
not create it in the first instance. 
Consequently, if a co-owner of the land created the mineral 
servitude in question, article 164 necessarily applies and requires 
the “consent of co-owners owning at least an undivided eighty 
percent interest in the land” so that operations might be conducted 
on the land.142 
Even having obtained the “consent of co-owners owning at 
least an undivided eighty percent interest in the land,” if that 
discrete mineral servitude is itself co-owned, or owned in 
indivision, article 175 also applies and requires the “consent of co-
owners owning at least an undivided eighty percent interest in the 
servitude” so that operations might be conducted on the land.143 
Thus, under these unique circumstances, two levels of consent 
must be obtained from two different categories of persons to 
operate on a co-owned servitude obtained from a co-owner of land. 
E. Jurisprudential Treatment of the Co-owned Servitudes Created 
by Partition 
It is not uncommon for co-owners to partition their land and 
reserve a mineral servitude on the partitioned land. In those cases, 
absent a clear stipulation to the contrary,144 the mineral servitude is 
                                                                                                             
 141. A top lease is a lease to take effect upon the expiration of an existing 
lease. See Scoggin v. Bagley, 368 So. 2d 763, 766 (La. Ct. App. 1979). 
 142.  LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:164. 
 143.  Id.; id. § 31:175. 
 144. A threshold question in a partition wherein a mineral servitude is reserved 
is whether the parties intended to create one mineral servitude over the entire tract 
or as many mineral servitudes as there are partitioned tracts. See, e.g., Whitehall 
Oil Co. v. Heard, 197 So. 2d 672, 676 (La. Ct. App. 1967) (“Did [the parties to the 
partition] intend each tract transferred to be subject to separate mineral royalty 
reservations which affected that tract alone? Or did they instead intend for each 
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owned in indivision in the same proportions that the land had been 
held prior to the partition. 
Such was the case in GMB Gas Corporation v. Cox145 in which 
on July 1, 1968, certain co-owners of a tract of land entered into a 
partition, which provided that “the parties shall continue to remain 
as owners in indivision with respect to the oil, gas and other 
minerals in, on and under the property herein partitioned.”146 Prior 
to this partition, a previous operator drilled ten wells on the co-
owned lands, and these wellbores remained on the premises.147  
Subsequent to the partition, on May 23, 1972, one group of the 
co-owners (the Sanders) of the minerals granted a mineral lease to 
GMB Gas Corporation.148 The other co-owner (Cox) was not a 
party to the mineral lease and refused to permit the lessee to 
conduct exploratory operations on the part of the lands that he 
received in the partition.149 
The Sanders’ lessee sought an injunction to prevent 
interference.150 Cox, the recalcitrant co-owner, reconvened for a 
judgment declaring the lease invalid and sought an injunction 
forbidding the lessee from conducting any operations on any part of 
the servitude tract in which he was a co-owner of the mineral 
servitude.151 
The court stated that the issue was “whether the lessee of a co-
owner of a mineral servitude created prior to the enactment of the 
Mineral Code may conduct operations on lands subject to the 
servitude without the consent of the other co-owner.”152 The court 
held that the Louisiana Mineral Code was applicable to “pre-code 
issues which have not been clearly resolved by the 
jurisprudence.”153Applying articles 66 and 67, the court concluded 
that the parties “intended to own the minerals under the entire 
[servitude] tract in indivision and to create a single mineral servitude 
for this purpose.”154 
                                                                                                             
 
coheir to have a single undivided mineral interest affecting the entire mass of the 
property partitioned by the agreements?”). 
 145. 340 So. 2d 638 (La. Ct. App. 1976). 
 146. Id. at 639. 
 147. Cox v. Sanders, 421 So. 2d 869, 871 (La. 1982). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. GMB Gas Corp. v. Cox, 340 So. 2d 638, 640 (La. Ct. App. 1976). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
2013] OIL IN THE FAMILY 771 
 
 
 
The court observed that under article 175,155 a “co-owner of a 
mineral servitude may not conduct operations on the property 
subject to the servitude without the consent of the other co-
owner.”156 Based on this article, the appellate court remanded for the 
entry of an injunction in favor of the recalcitrant, nonconsenting co-
owner and against the lessee.157 
In a subsequent suit, Mrs. Cox sued to have the Sanders’ mineral 
servitude terminated.158 The court observed that it 
is important to note that in this suit [Mrs. Cox] is asserting 
her rights as a land owner against the owner of an 
undivided interest in a mineral servitude, and thus she is 
asserting rights on a different basis than those which she 
asserted in the prior case, . . . wherein she was asserting her 
rights as the co-owner of an undivided mineral servitude.159 
The court first considered the issue of whether the Louisiana 
Mineral Code could be applied to the controversy because the 
mineral servitude was created in 1968.160 The supreme court noted 
that the court of appeal had applied the Louisiana Mineral Code 
but stated that “the controlling law is the pre-codal law applicable 
to the rights existing between land owner and mineral interest 
owner, and not between two mineral interest owners.”161 
The court found that the rule of Clark v. Tensas Delta Land 
Company162 and Starr Davis Oil Company, Inc. v. Webber163 was 
applicable.164 The court then concluded that “the Sanders were 
given the right by the landowner to explore and drill upon the 
partitioned lands and that the production obtained by the Sanders’ 
lessee was sufficient to interrupt prescription of Sanders mineral 
servitude for non-use.”165 The court further held that “the 
interruption of prescription applied not only to the tract owned by 
Sanders upon which production was had but also upon the 
contiguous tracts owned by Cox.”166 
                                                                                                             
 155. Decided in 1976, GMB Gas Corporation involved the original version 
of Article 175, prior to its amendments in 1986 and 1988. 
 156. GMB Gas Corp., 340 So. 2d at 640. 
 157. Id. at 641. 
 158. Cox v. Sanders, 421 So. 2d 869, 870 (La. 1982). 
 159. Id. at 871. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 872. 
 162. 136 So. 1 (La. 1931). 
 163. 48 So. 2d 906 (La. 1950). 
 164. Cox, 421 So. 2d at 872. 
 165. Id. at 873. 
 166. Id. 
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VII. RIGHTS OF CO-OWNERS OF LAND TO OPERATE ON THE LAND, 
INDEPENDENT OF A MINERAL RIGHT 
There is no article in the Louisiana Mineral Code that addresses 
the right of a co-owner of land to operate in its own right on the co-
owned property in the absence of a mineral right regulated by 
articles 164, 166, or 175. This is understandable because the Mineral 
Code regulates “mineral rights,” and the conduct of drilling 
activities by a landowner in no manner involves a mineral right.167 
Rather, it is the availment of a landowner’s inherent right in his 
ownership of the land.168 This was recognized in one case in the 
following observation: 
The doctrine that the owner of land has no property right in 
the oil or gas beneath the surface, until he has reduced it to 
possession, in no manner denies to such owner the 
exclusive right to the use of the surface for the purpose of 
such reduction, or for any other purpose, not prohibited by 
law, but, to the contrary, concedes that right, as inherent in 
the title to the land, and subject only to the control of the 
state, in the exercise of its police power; and the right may 
be sold, as may be any other right, and may carry with it 
the right to the oil and gas that may be found and reduced 
to possession.169 
Hence, as article 2 of the Louisiana Mineral Code instructs,170 
the Civil Code would regulate this issue. Civil Code article 801 
says that “[t]he use and management of the thing held in indivision 
is determined by agreement of all the co-owners.”171  
Further, because oil and gas activities are not the normal or usual 
activities conducted on land, such activities would constitute 
“substantial alterations or substantial improvements.” In that regard, 
the Civil Code further provides that “[s]ubstantial alterations or 
                                                                                                             
 167. “Whilst it is true that ‘oil and gas, in place, are not subject to absolute 
ownership as specific things apart from the soil of which they form part,’ 
nevertheless it is equally well settled that the owner of the soil has alone the 
right to sever and appropriate them, which right, of course, he may cede to 
another.” Allies Oil Co. v. Ayers, 92 So. 720, 720 (La. 1922). 
 168. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:6 (2000). 
 169. Strother v. Mangham, 70 So. 426, 440 (La. 1915) (citations omitted). 
 170. “The provisions of this Code are supplementary to those of the 
Louisiana Civil Code and are applicable specifically to the subject matter of 
mineral law. In the event of conflict between the provisions of this Code and 
those of the Civil Code or other laws the provisions of this Code shall prevail. If 
this Code does not expressly or impliedly provide for a particular situation, the 
Civil Code or other laws are applicable.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:2. 
 171. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 801 (2008).  
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substantial improvements to the thing held in indivision may be 
undertaken only with the consent of all the co-owners.”172 
Thus, in the absence of an agreement providing a different 
level of consent, unanimity would be needed for one co-owner to 
conduct E&P operations on the co-owned land.173 
VIII. FORM, DURATION, AND EXTENT OF CONSENT 
A. Introduction 
The Louisiana Mineral Code neither prescribes the form of the 
consent that articles 164, 166, or 175 envision, nor stipulates how 
it might be manifested.174 Obviously, to avoid controversy (an 
admittedly radical thought in our “All in the Family” situation), a 
party desiring to conduct operations on co-owned land or a co-
owned servitude should acquire such consent in writing and should 
be as clear and concise as possible.175 
B. Form of Consent 
1. Must Consent Be Granted in Writing? 
Examining the issue of form in a different way, the issue of 
whether a co-owner’s verbal granting of consent may be proven by 
oral testimony must be considered. More precisely, because the co-
owned land constitutes immovable property, is such evidence 
precluded by the “parol evidence exclusionary rule”?176 
No reported decision has considered this precise issue in the 
context of the relevant articles. However, one case suggests that 
the “parol evidence exclusionary rule” should not be an obstacle to 
proving, by other than written evidence, the granting of consent to 
operate.177 
                                                                                                             
 172. Id. art. 804. 
 173. The law noted supra in Part II.A would provide the guidance under such 
circumstances. 
 174. Neither did the Civil Code, insofar as it pertained to the use of a predial 
servitude created by a co-owner, “provide any particular form or manner by 
which the consent is given.” Superior Oil Producing Co. v. Leckelt, 181 So. 462, 
467 (La. 1938). 
 175. In a non-oil-and-gas case, it has been held that “the law does not require 
that the consent of co-owners be written in order to lease property.” Schroth v. 
Seminole Supermarket, Inc., 829 So. 2d 597, 600 (La. Ct. App. 2002). 
 176. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1832 (2008); id. art. 1839. 
 177. “The management and development of this [co-owned] property contains 
issues which are wholly distinct from the ownership of the property and the 
admission of parol evidence to establish a management agreement concerning the 
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2. Should the Consent, if Obtained in Writing, Be Recorded? 
If the consent is obtained in writing (and the author hopes that 
this Article demonstrates that there are a variety of reasons why it 
should be), the question arises as to whether it must (or should) be 
recorded. The easy answer is, “Yes, why not record it?” It would be 
“money well spent.” 
But that easy response does not answer the question of whether 
it must be recorded. It is submitted that, without regard to the 
obvious prudence of doing so, the answer is, “No, it is not necessary 
to record it.” The notion of “consent,” for these purposes, might be 
likened to the concept of “authority” to act, such that under 
applicable law, a “matter of . . . authority . . . and a similar matter 
pertaining to rights and obligations evidenced by a recorded 
instrument are effective as to a third person although not evidenced 
of record.”178 In the context of this Article, the reference to “a 
recorded instrument” would be to the juridical act creating the 
mineral servitude (whether by grant or reservation) or to a mineral 
lease. 
3. Must Consent Be Granted by a Mineral Lease? 
The 80% rule—in the circumstances when it applies—only 
addresses the issue of whether operations can be conducted on the 
ground. The rule does not mean that a co-owner cannot grant a 
mineral lease unless the consent of not less than 80% of the co-
owners is obtained. Consistent with this observation, article 166 of 
the Louisiana Mineral Code says that “the lessee . . . may not 
exercise his rights thereunder without consent of co-owners 
owning at least an undivided eighty percent interest in the land.”179 
While a mineral lease is, quite obviously, a juridical act, which, 
by its very nature, necessarily grants consent to operate,180 and is 
the more typical vehicle by which consent is manifested, the 
                                                                                                             
 
property would not be violative of LSA-C.C. Arts. 1832 and 1839.” Riddle v. 
Simmons, 589 So. 2d 89, 92 (La. Ct. App. 1991). “In cases such as this, however, 
where the claimants are co-owners of the immovable property, we see no reason to 
exclude parol evidence to establish agreements concerning the management, 
exploitation, development or sharing of profits with reference to the co-owned 
property.” Id. at 93. 
 178. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3339 (2007) (emphasis added). 
 179. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:166 (2000) (emphasis added).  
 180. “A mineral lease is a contract by which the lessee is granted the right to 
explore for and produce minerals. A single lease may be created on two or more 
noncontiguous tracts of land . . . .” Id. § 31:114. But see infra Part VIII.F. 
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articles do not require that a mineral lease be acquired to grant 
consent. In other words, a mineral lease is sufficient, but not 
necessary, to grant the requisite consent of a co-owner.  
So, while the granting of a mineral lease is one thing, the 
conduction of operations thereunder is another matter. A mineral 
lease can be granted, without regard to the level of consent, but the 
lessee cannot operate on the leased premises without the requisite 
level of consent. Hence, permission can also be granted by a 
simple writing that expresses the “consent” of the owner to the 
conduction of operations. Such a “simple writing” may be as 
concise as the following, to-wit: “As a co-owner of Blackacre, I 
hereby grant my consent that you may conduct oil and gas 
activities and drilling operations on the land. I expressly retain all 
rights to production attributable to my interest in the land.” 
While a written document of this sort would suffice as the 
granting of consent by a co-owner, is it a mineral lease? As noted 
above, a mineral lease is defined as “a contract by which the lessee 
is granted the right to explore for and produce minerals.”181 
Although this codal definition does not explicitly require that a 
traditional royalty be reserved or that any of the other customary 
features of a mineral lease be included, the reference to lessee 
would conjure the traditional attributes of a mineral lease such that 
this “simple writing” would not be deemed for any purpose to 
constitute a mineral lease. This observation is not a matter of mere 
semantics or academic intrigue; it is important for a variety of 
purposes.182 
4. Can Tacit Consent Be Inferred from a Co-owner’s Conduct? 
As noted previously, the court in the early case of Carroll 
noted that “the owner of an undivided half of a tract of land has not 
the right to exploit the land for oil and gas without the consent, 
implied or express, of his co-owner, and not having this right 
himself he cannot confer it upon a lessee.”183 
                                                                                                             
 181. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:114. 
 182. For example, an interest that is not subject to a mineral lease is, self-
evidently, “unleased,” such that the owner of that interest (if the Commissioner 
of Conservation unitizes the well) has a right and remedy under the Well Cost 
Reporting Statute, id. § 30:103.1–103.2 (2007), but is not subject to the Risk Fee 
Act, id. § 30:10(A)(2) (Supp. 2013). See Patrick S. Ottinger, After the Lessee 
Walks Away—The Rights and Obligations of the Unleased Mineral Owner in a 
Producing Unit, in FIFTY-FIFTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON MINERAL LAW 59 
(Patrick H. Martin ed., 2008). 
 183. Gulf Refining Co. of La. v. Carroll, 82 So. 277, 301 (La. 1919) (emphasis 
added). 
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Although admittedly arising in a different context (the need for 
a lessor’s consent to a proposed transfer of a commercial lease), 
the permissibility of consent that is not in writing, but which might 
be inferred by the party’s action or inaction, was discussed by an 
early court as follows: 
The tacit consent suffices, even when it has been said that 
the consent in writing of the lessor shall be necessary. The 
necessity of a writing has been stipulated only to facilitate 
the proof: the parties did not intend to subordinate the 
validity of the sub-lease to a writing. Even had they so 
intended, the verbal or tacit consent would still be sufficient, 
because the lessor could not bind his hands and condemn 
himself not to be able to consent without a writing; therefore 
if he gives his consent without writing, a new agreement is 
formed by virtue of which the sub-lease is admitted by the 
lessor.184 
Guided by this early case, if tacit consent suffices even in the 
face of an explicit requirement that it be in writing, a fortiori, tacit 
consent should suffice where, as here, there is no legal requirement 
for a writing. 
In Superior Oil Producing Company v. Leckelt,185 it was held 
that although a mineral servitude granted by less than all of the co-
owners “would not be null but its execution would be suspended 
until the consent of the coowners was given,”186 those nonsignatory 
“coowners acquiesced in the payment of the royalties to [the mineral 
servitude owner]” and that this acquiescence “was in effect the 
giving of consent by the coowners.”187 
While not precisely involving tacit consent, it was held in 
another case that “execution of the division orders and the receipt 
of [a co-owner’s] share of the proceeds of all of the oil produced 
and sold was a complete ratification by defendant of the drilling 
operations conducted by plaintiff on the whole property.”188 
Although tacit consent to the conduction of operations has been 
found in these cases, it must be observed that this case predated the 
adoption of the amendments in 1988 with the resultant requirement 
that the proviso be met. Because the codal requirement is really 
“consent plus,” it remains to be seen if a court would infer consent 
where, despite the open and notorious nature of the co-owner’s 
                                                                                                             
 184. McWilliams v. Dawes, 5 Pelt. 577, 593 (La. Ct. App. 1922). 
 185. 181 So. 462 (La. 1938). 
 186. Id. at 467. 
 187. Id. at 468. 
 188. Connette v. Wright, 98 So. 674, 676 (La. 1924). 
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action, there is no showing that the operator has satisfied the 
proviso of the relevant article. 
C. Duration of Consent 
Unresolved is the issue of whether the consent has a term—
does it only apply to one then-anticipated distinct operation? Or, 
does the consent continue to apply to future operations beyond the 
first anticipated operation for the duration of the mineral right in 
question? 
If the consent is granted with respect to one identified 
operation, it would—in the absence of greater clarity—likely be 
construed to be limited to that distinct operation, and not to apply 
to future, nondescribed operations. Conversely, if it is stated in 
more general language without a reference to a specific well or 
other activity, it would likely be construed as continuing, without 
limitation as to time. 
Is the success vel non of the first operation, to which the 
requisite consent was granted, relevant to these questions? If the first 
operation pursuant to consent is a dry hole, rather than a producer, 
must new consent be obtained, or does such consent continue to 
apply to subsequent operations? 
Because neither the Mineral Code nor the interpretive 
jurisprudence provide answers to these questions, suffice it to say 
that the party desiring to operate should obviate these compelling 
issues by obtaining the consent in writing. 
D. Revocability of Consent 
Additionally, can the consent, once granted and reaching the 
requisite level, be revoked? And, if so, what level of revocation is 
necessary to rescind that previously granted consent?  
If revocable at all, what activities, preliminary to spudding the 
well,189 taken by the operator in reliance on the previously granted 
consent will be deemed to preclude, under a theory of detrimental 
reliance or estoppel, a revocation of consent?190 If the lessee, 
                                                                                                             
 189. “[T]he term to ‘spud in’ has a well-defined meaning in the oil industry 
as the first boring of the hole in the ground, that is, the first actual penetration of 
the earth with a drilling bit . . . .” Hilliard v. Franzheim, 180 So. 2d 746, 747 
(La. Ct. App. 1965). 
 190. In Louisiana, a claim of detrimental reliance is grounded in Louisiana 
Civil Code article 1967, which reads as follows:  
Cause is the reason why a party obligates himself. A party may be 
obligated by a promise when he knew or should have known that the 
promise would induce the other party to rely on it to his detriment and 
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having obtained the requisite consent, then proceeds to sell 
interests in its “drilling deal,” can consent thereafter be revoked 
after parties have relied to their detriment upon the consent 
previously granted? This significant contingency or potentiality, if 
none other, argues forcefully for obtaining consent in writing with 
sufficient clarity. 
E. Transfer of Lease After Obtaining Consent 
If a lessee under a mineral lease or leases that, in the aggregate, 
cover(s) less than all of the co-owners in a tract of land obtains the 
requisite level of consent from the nonsignatory co-owner(s) and 
thereafter transfers the lease(s), does the assignee of such lease(s) 
get the benefit of such previously granted consent? That is to say, 
is the consent itself transferable, and, if so, does it necessarily 
attend the transfer of the lease(s), or must it be specially 
assigned?191 
Neither the Louisiana Mineral Code nor jurisprudence 
addresses this precise question; yet, it might be argued that, there 
being no express requirement that the consent be in writing, and, 
further, that tacit consent has been found in at least one case,192 the 
consent follows the lease(s) when transferred. Although articles 
128193 and 131194 of the Louisiana Mineral Code may be facially 
interpreted to support this observation, this is a rather tenuous basis 
to resolve the important issue of the successor lessee’s right to 
operate pursuant to previously granted consent. It is for this reason, 
if no other, that it is prudent to obtain the consent in writing and to 
expressly transfer it to the assignee or sublessee. 
                                                                                                             
 
the other party was reasonable in so relying. Recovery may be limited 
to the expenses incurred or the damages suffered as a result of the 
promisee’s reliance on the promise. Reliance on a gratuitous promise 
made without required formalities is not reasonable. 
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1967 (2008). 
 191. This notion of rights as being either “personal” or “real” has been 
judicially examined in the context of the “subsequent purchaser doctrine.” See, 
e.g., Eagle Pipe & Supply, Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 79 So. 3d 246 (La. 2011). 
 192. See supra text accompanying notes 184–88. 
 193. “To the extent of the interest acquired, an assignee or sublessee acquires 
the rights and powers of the lessee and becomes responsible directly to the 
original lessor for performance of the lessee’s obligations.” LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 31:128 (2000). 
 194. “A mineral lessor must accept performance by an assignee or sublessee 
whether or not the assignment or sublease is filed for registry.” Id. § 31:131. 
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F. Mineral Lease Containing a “No Surface Operations” Clause 
A party desiring to operate on co-owned land often “bundles” 
the consent represented by its mineral lease(s) with the consent 
vested in another party who holds a mineral lease from one or 
more other co-owners of the targeted leased premises.195 If any of 
the mineral leases contains a “no surface operations” clause, yet 
the undivided interest represented by the lease is necessary to reach 
the requisite level of consent, the operator could not operate on the 
surface of the co-owned land without aggregating—from any 
source—the unrestricted or unconditional consent of at least 80% 
of the co-owners “in the land” or “in the servitude,” as the case 
may be.  
Conversely, if the operator obtains the consent of at least 80% 
of the co-owners in the land or servitude, it can conduct operations 
thereon, notwithstanding that any other co-owner (whose interest is 
not counted in the attainment of the requisite 80%) might have 
granted a lease with a “no surface operations” clause. This is so 
because, having obtained the consent of at least 80% of the co-
owners, and having complied with the proviso, it has the right 
operate at that level, the consent (or absence of consent) of the 
balance of the co-owners being immaterial. 
Also unanswered is the question of whether the party lessor 
who, by reason of the “no surface operations” clause contained in 
the lease, did not give consent to operate on the surface of the 
lands, has a claim for damages or injunction against the operator 
who is not its lessee. The answer should be “no” because the 
operator—having obtained the requisite level of consent—does not 
need any additional consent, provided that it has complied with the 
requirements of the relevant article. 
The attainment of consent is one thing; the repudiation of a 
contractual commitment is another. Thus, if the lessee under a “no 
surface operations” clause participates (by way of financial 
support) in drilling operations conducted by another party who has 
independently attained the requisite level of unconditional consent 
from other co-owners of the land, the lessee might be subject to a 
claim for damages for violating the terms of its lease.196 However, 
the lessor under such a restricted lease should not be able to enjoin 
                                                                                                             
 195. This “bundling” might be accomplished by a joint operating agreement, 
a participation agreement, a “dry hole letter,” or a farm-in agreement executed 
by the working interest owners. See Patrick S. Ottinger, Be Careful What You 
Ask for: Subsequent Operations Under the Model Form Operating Agreement, 
in SIXTY-THIRD ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON OIL AND GAS LAW ch. 7 (2012). 
 196. “If a mineral lease is violated, an aggrieved party is entitled to any 
appropriate relief provided by law.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:134. 
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the drilling operations if the operator has accumulated the requisite 
level of consent without regard to the interest of that lessor. 
IX. DOING THE MATH 
Calculating the requisite consent is simple under articles 164 
and 166—it is necessary to get the consent of at least 80% of the 
co-owners “in the land” to allow a person to operate on the co-
owned land. This consent may be granted through either a mineral 
servitude granted by less than all of the co-owners or a mineral 
lease granted by less than all of the co-owners “in the land.” 
By its nature, article 175 works differently. This article 
addresses the rights of co-owners of a discrete, co-owned mineral 
servitude—either personally or through another—to operate on the 
land burdened by the servitude. In this situation, the consent needed 
is 80% of the co-owners “in the servitude.” 
Thus, regardless of the size or quantification of the mineral 
servitude, if the mineral servitude is co-owned, no E&P operations 
may be undertaken on the burdened land without the consent of not 
less than 80% of the co-owners “in the servitude.” For example, if 
the mineral servitude pertains to, say, one-half of the minerals in 
the land,197 and if such servitude is owned by, say, ten persons, 
then, at least eight of those co-owners must consent so that 
operations may be conducted pursuant to that servitude—eight out 
of ten is 80%. 
 One must note that eight of ten owners of a mineral servitude 
in and to one-half of the minerals represent, in the vernacular, a 
“net” 40% interest in the entire minerals in and under the land. 
There is no need to secure the consent from the owners of an 
additional 40% interest in the minerals in and under the land—it is 
unnecessary to get to 80% of the whole interest in the land or 
minerals. Rather, what is necessary is to obtain the consent of the 
owners’ 80% of the mineral servitude in question. The interest of 
the party who has granted the mineral right is included in the 
calculation of the 80%. 
Illustrative of this proposition is the case of Superior Oil 
Producing Company v. Leckelt, wherein a widower and five 
children granted a mineral lease.198 After the lease was granted, the 
                                                                                                             
 197. Although it is sometimes so called, this is not a half-mineral servitude. 
Rather, it is a full mineral servitude in and to one-half of the minerals. See, e.g., 
Clark v. Tensas Delta Land Co., 136 So. 1, 2 (La. 1931) (stating that what the 
defendant “owned was not half of the right to the minerals, but the right to half 
of the minerals, in Clark’s land”). 
 198. Superior Oil Producing Co. v. Leckelt, 181 So. 462, 463 (La. 1938). 
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children’s father died, leaving his five children, who thereupon 
owned the entire property in indivision, one-fifth each, subject to 
the existing lease.199 
During the term of the lease, one of the children, Richard 
Leckelt, executed a mineral deed to William Campbell conveying 
“an undivided on[e]-half interest in all the minerals that Richard 
Leckelt owned in and under the property.”200 
Thereafter, Richard Leckelt executed a mineral deed to P. S. 
Moore “conveying an undivided one-half interest in all the minerals 
that he owned in and under the property.”201 
In both instances, the mineral deeds were made subject to the 
then-existing mineral lease.202 The outstanding mineral lease expired 
and was released.203 Thereafter, but within ten years of the last use 
of the servitude,204 mineral leases were “acquired . . . from all the 
co-owners, except Richard Leckelt, and from all the outstanding 
holders of minerals rights.”205 A well was drilled pursuant to this 
lease.206  
After Richard Leckelt challenged the validity of this latter lease, 
the lessee under the subsequently granted mineral lease sued to 
cancel a mineral lease granted by Richard Leckelt and other 
documents that the plaintiff alleged had “cast a cloud upon 
plaintiff’s titles.”207 
Richard Leckelt, a defendant, contended that the lease was 
invalid because, as a co-owner of the property, his consent was 
necessary.208 The court rejected this contention, saying that 
Richard Leckelt consented to the establishment of the 
servitude and he would be estopped from preventing 
William Campbell from exercising the servitude under the 
provisions of article 739209 and cannot prevent the exercise 
of the servitude by objecting on the ground that the consent 
                                                                                                             
 199. See id. 
 200. Id.  
 201. Id.  
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 463–64. 
 204. “A mineral servitude is extinguished by: prescription resulting from 
nonuse for ten years . . . .” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:27(1) (2000). 
 205. Leckelt, 181 So. at 464. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. See id. at 464. 
 209. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 715 (2008) (“A co-owner who has 
consented to the establishment of a predial servitude on the entire estate owned 
in indivision may not prevent its exercise on the ground that the consent of his 
co-owner has not been obtained.”). 
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of the other coproprietors has not been given. Furthermore 
he would be estopped from preventing William Campbell 
from exercising the servitude by derogating from or 
destroying his own grant.210 
The court upheld the mineral lease granted by the co-owners of 
the land and by the owner of the mineral servitude created by 
Richard Leckelt.211 
X. THE PROVISO 
A. The Legislature Lowers the Threshold but Introduces a Proviso 
When the Louisiana Legislature amended the three articles in 
1986 to lower the consent threshold from 100% to 90%, there was 
no further requirement on the part of the party desiring to operate. 
Thus, with the consent of 90% of the co-owners of either a tract or 
a distinct mineral servitude, E&P operations could be conducted 
without any further showing or condition. 
However, in 1988, when the Legislature amended the three 
articles to lower the consent threshold from 90% to 80%, it added a 
proviso to each article. The proviso in each of the three articles 
requires “that he [that is, the person who desires to conduct E&P 
operations] has made every effort to contact such co-owners and, if 
contacted, has offered to contract with them on substantially the 
same basis that he has contracted with another co-owner.”212 
B. Unanswered Questions 
This language presents a few unanswered questions. Noting 
that the articles require that “every effort” be made to contact the 
other co-owners, and that the adjective reasonable does not modify 
those words, what effort “to contact” will be deemed to be 
sufficient or, more importantly, will be deemed to fall short of 
constituting “every effort”? Reminiscent of the famous utterance of 
our 42nd president, it “depends upon what the meaning of the word 
[‘every’] is.”213 
                                                                                                             
 210. Leckelt, 181 So. at 467.  
 211. Id. at 468. 
 212. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:164, :166, :175 (2000). 
 213. See 1998: Clinton’s Grand Jury Testimony Released, BBC HOME (Sept. 
21, 1998), http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/september/21/newsid 
_2525000/2525339.stm. 
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Is the phrase “every effort” intended to be read literally, or 
does it mean “every reasonable effort”?214 If a lessee cannot locate 
an owner using conventional methods, does the lessee have to 
advertise in a newspaper in an attempt to ascertain the absentee’s 
whereabouts? What effort will be deemed to fail to constitute the 
making of “every effort” to contact these parties? 
In the absence of unanimous consent, how does a title 
examiner issue an opinion that the unsuccessful efforts “to contact” 
the yet-to-consent co-owner are nevertheless sufficient to 
constitute “every effort,” and, thus, that the proviso has been 
satisfied such that E&P operations can be lawfully conducted even 
without the consent of the parties who have not been contacted? 
Who is to be contacted? The articles say, “such co-owners.” 
But who are “such co-owners”? Grammatically, the word such, as 
used in this sentence, seems to refer to those co-owners who have 
already consented.215 However, logic suggests that it probably 
refers to all co-owners with whom the lessee (or other party 
desiring to operate) has not yet contracted. 
Those who are contacted must be “offered [the opportunity] to 
contract . . . on substantially the same basis that [the party desiring 
to operate] has contracted with another co-owner.”216 Does the 
proviso essentially impose a statutory “most favored nations” 
clause?217 To whose “other contract” or “basis [of terms]” is this to 
be compared? What, for these purposes, does “another co-owner” 
mean?  
What if the lessee has reached five different deals with five 
distinct co-owners—different bonus, rental, royalty, primary term, 
Pugh clause term, other specific provisions, etc.? What does 
                                                                                                             
 214. In several articles of the Louisiana Mineral Code, a statement or legal 
requirement is modified by a standard of reasonableness. Thus, article 11(A) of 
the Mineral Code requires “reasonable regard” in the exercise of rights, LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:11(A) (Supp. 2013); article 22 limits use of a mineral 
servitude to that which is “reasonably necessary” and requires restoration of the 
surface “at the earliest reasonable time,” id. § 31:22 (2000); article 29 requires a 
“reasonable expectation” for a dry hole to constitute a “good faith operation,” id. 
§ 31:29; and numerous articles allude to a “reasonably prudent operator,” e.g., 
id. § 31:122. The absence of such a modifier in these articles could be relevant. 
 215. “Where the word [such] modifies a term, that term is limited to the 
previous identification of that same term within the statute.” Ouachita Parish 
Sch. Bd. v. Ouachita Parish Supervisors Ass’n, 362 So. 2d 1138, 1141 (La. Ct. 
App. 1978) (case actually involved the modifying term said, but the conclusion 
to be drawn is the same). See also Mathews v. Goodrich Oil Co., 471 So. 2d 938 
(La. Ct. App. 1985); Avatar Exploration, Inc. v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 933 F.2d 
314 (5th Cir. 1991). 
 216. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:164, :166, :175. 
 217. See supra note 119. 
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“substantially the same basis” mean? Does the operator discharge 
its duty under the proviso by merely offering “to contract,” but 
only on the terms most favorable to it? Can the co-owner so 
contacted insist that it be offered the opportunity to contract on the 
terms which are most favorable to it, failing which, the proviso has 
not been met? A Rubik’s Cube comes to mind.  
Is the implication that unless the lessee has tried to contact and 
contract with all co-owners, his operations under lease(s) from, 
say, 95% of the co-owners could be opposed by non-contracting 
parties? What standard of proof will be required to demonstrate 
that the lessee has complied with the proviso (or has made “every 
effort” to do so)? Should all offers to lease be in writing?  
In view of these unanswered issues, it is appropriate to again 
ask the question: How can a title examiner approve title for drilling 
purposes under these circumstances? 
C. The “Other” Contract 
Although each of the three articles uses the word as a verb and 
not a noun, the reference to contract is a bit uncertain when one 
considers that, as noted above, the requisite consent may be granted 
and obtained by a simple writing, involving no consideration. As 
previously noted, it is not necessary that the operator acquire a 
mineral lease, only that “consent” be obtained. 
The “contract” to which article 164 refers would seemingly be 
a mineral deed because it seems to contemplate a third person, 
other than one of the co-owners, who seeks to operate pursuant to a 
mineral servitude. 
The “contract” that article 166 contemplates would apparently 
be a mineral lease because it seems to anticipate a third person, 
other than one of the co-owners, who seeks to operate under a 
mineral lease. 
The “contract” to which article 175 refers would presumably 
be a simple statement of consent because, by definition, it does not 
seem to envision a third person but rather one of the owners of the 
co-owned mineral servitude. Given the context regulated by 
Article 175, the use of the word contract seems somewhat 
misplaced and is probably the result of inadvertence in the 
legislative drafting process, which likely duplicated the three 
articles. 
XI. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF A NONCONSENTING OWNER 
The last sentence of each of the relevant articles recognizes that 
a party who does not grant its consent cannot be charged with any 
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portion of the costs incurred in the operation. This is consistent 
with general law, which rarely imposes personal liability on a party 
who has not consented to or agreed to participate in the cost, risk, 
and expense of the drilling of a well. However, as a corollary, the 
interest of the nonconsenting owner is liable, on an in rem basis, 
for such owner’s proportionate share of the drilling costs.218 
The court in Arkansas Fuel Oil Corporation v. Weber affirmed 
the proposition that “while the right of an owner to refrain from 
exercising his right of ownership is absolute, he is nevertheless, 
precluded from the enjoyment of profits without participation in 
the expenses incurred in the production of such profits.”219 
Another example of this proposition is found in Davis Oil 
Company v. Steamboat Petroleum Corporation where the Supreme 
Court stated: “A non-operating owner of a mineral interest, who 
does not consent to operations within a compulsory drilling unit by 
an operating owner, has no liability for the costs of development 
and operations except out of his share of production.”220 
The verbiage of each of the relevant articles is identical in 
saying that the nonconsenting co-owner “has no liability for the 
costs of development and operations, except out of his share of 
production,”221 except that article 166 makes reference to “the 
costs of development and operations or other costs.”222 Assuming 
that it was intentional (and even meaningful), it is unapparent why 
this article (addressing the granting of a mineral lease by a co-
owner of land) would justify this different formulation. 
XII. APPLICATION OF CONSENT REQUIREMENTS TO THE CONDUCT 
OF SEISMIC ACTIVITIES ON CO-OWNED LANDS OR CO-OWNED 
MINERAL SERVITUDES 
By reason of legislative amendments in 1995,223 article 166—
in addition to specifying the requisite consent necessary to conduct 
E&P operations under a mineral lease granted by less than all co-
owners—also requires the same level of consent to “operate”—
permit your author to change that word to “conduct activities”—
under “a valid lease or permit for geological surveys, by means of 
a torsion balance, seismographic explosions, mechanical device, or 
any other method.”224 Similarly, article 175 defines operations (for 
                                                                                                             
 218. See Ottinger, supra note 182. 
 219. 149 So. 2d 101, 108 (La. Ct. App. 1963). 
 220. 583 So. 2d 1139, 1141 (La. 1991). 
 221. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:164, :166, :175. 
 222. Id. § 31:166 (emphasis added). 
 223. Act No. 479, 1995 La. Acts 1264. 
 224. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:166. 
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purposes of that article) as including “geological surveys, by 
means of a torsion balance, seismographic explosions, mechanical 
device, or any other method.”225 
These amendments to articles 166 and 175 were adopted in 
response to the controversial 1994 decision in Jeanes v. G.F.S. 
Company.226 In that case, the defendant conducted seismic 
operations on a tract of land, which approximately 80 co-owners 
owned.227 The seismic company claimed that it had procured the 
“consent of 80% of the mineral servitude owners pursuant to La. 
R.S. 31:175 and therefore it could conduct operations on the 
property.”228 However, because a certain corporation, to which 
most of the co-owners transferred their surface interest, “did not 
own an interest in a mineral servitude on the land,” the court held 
that article 175 “does not apply to this case.”229  
The court further noted that “what was being conducted on this 
land were seismic operations.”230 The court held that Louisiana 
Revised Statutes section 30:217231 “is applicable to this case” and 
stated as follows: 
G.F.S. for its operations needed the consent of the owner of 
the land irrespective of who owned the mineral rights. The 
evidence is clear that G.F.S. obtained permission of more 
than 80% of the landowners, since Wetlands is the owner 
of the land, but did not obtain permission from Jeanes. 
 
La. Civ. Code art. 801 provides that the use and management 
of the thing held in indivision is determined by agreement of 
all the co-owners. Since G.F.S. used the land for its seismic 
exploration, it needed the consent of all the co-owners of the 
land. It failed to get the consent of Jeanes and is therefore 
liable to her.232 
Prior to 1995, the term operations, as it appears in several 
articles of the Louisiana Mineral Code, was used in the context of 
                                                                                                             
 225. Id. § 31:175. 
 226. 647 So. 2d 533 (La. Ct. App. 1994). 
 227. Id. at 534. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. at 534–35. 
 230. Id. at 535. 
 231. This statute requires the consent of the “owner or the party or parties 
authorized to execute geological surveys, leases, or permits as provided in the 
Louisiana Mineral Code” prior to conducting geophysical surveys. LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 30:217(A)(1) (2007). 
 232. Jeanes, 647 So. 2d at 535 (citing State v. Evans, 38 So. 2d 140 (La. 
1948); Picou v. Fohs Oil Co., 64 So. 2d 434 (La. 1953); Layne Louisiana Co. v. 
Superior Oil Co., 26 So. 2d 20 (La. 1946)). 
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“drilling or mining operations.”233 Indeed, the Louisiana Supreme 
Court in Bouterie v. Kleinpeter held that operations means and 
relates to “the physical activity associated with the attempt to 
discover or maintain production.”234 Geophysical, or seismic, 
activities are simply not of this character. 
To expand the definition of operations to include the conduct 
of geophysical or seismic activities somewhat distorts that 
important word because the traditional understanding of operations 
has reference to those E&P activities that might be conducted 
under a mineral lease or a mineral servitude, having the result of 
maintaining the lease or interrupting prescription accruing against 
the servitude. Clearly, geophysical or seismic activities would 
neither maintain leasehold rights under a mineral lease nor 
interrupt prescription accruing against a mineral servitude.235 They 
are simply not operations, in the industry-accepted sense of the 
word.236 
The conduction of geophysical or seismic activities is not in 
and of itself the exploitation of a mineral right. If anything, such 
activities are more akin to a helicopter flyover of a potential 
drillsite for the purpose of ascertaining or evaluating topographical 
impediments to the conduction of E&P operations.237 While this 
may be important, it is not per se relevant to the “use” of a mineral 
right, and for this reason alone, the 1995 amendment to the 
Louisiana Mineral Code seems unwarranted. 
To legislatively address the disconcerting decision in Jeanes by 
amending these articles of the Louisiana Mineral Code (and thereby 
distorting the traditional understanding of operations) seems both 
misplaced and a bit of overkill. A preferable manner of addressing 
                                                                                                             
 233. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:14, :30, :31, :32, :47, :60, :112, 
:115, :123, :213(4), :213(6) (2000). 
 234. 247 So. 2d 548, 555 (La. 1971). 
 235. “Preparations for the commencement of actual drilling or mining 
operations, such as geological or geophysical exploration, surveying, clearing of 
a site, and the hauling and erection of materials and structures necessary to 
conduct operations do not interrupt prescription.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:30. 
 236. Rather, as to mineral servitudes, “interruption takes place on the date 
actual drilling . . . operations are commenced on the land burdened by the 
servitude.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 237. But see Musser-Davis Land Co. v. Union Pac. Res. Co., 201 F.3d 561 
(5th Cir. 2000) (holding that, unless excluded by contract, the right to conduct 
seismic operations was inherent in the grant of a mineral lease). The court’s 
analysis seemingly viewed seismic activities as being within the ambit of 
exploration. That does not mean, however, that the conduction of geophysical 
operations, without more, would serve to maintain leasehold rights in the same 
manner as conventional drilling would. No one could seriously contend that the 
conduction of geophysical operations over an anniversary date of a mineral lease 
would maintain leasehold rights and abate the need to pay a delay rental.  
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this issue would have been to clarify Louisiana Revised Statutes 
section 30:217, which regulates the conduct of geophysical or 
seismic operations.  
To be sure, amending articles 166 and 175 of the Mineral Code 
without a corresponding amendment to Louisiana Revised Statutes 
section 30:217 only confuses the situation. The latter is a criminal 
statute; therefore, one should diligently comply with it or not 
violate its terms.238 The difficulty is that, while such criminal 
statute does contain a definition of the term owner, it is a negative 
definition, explaining what the term does not include.239 While that 
definition is immaterial in a situation where the landowner 
inherently owns its rights to the minerals underlying its lands (for 
the reason that no mineral servitude exists),240 it is less than clear 
in the opposite situation—that is, where the land is burdened by 
one or more mineral servitudes. 
Perhaps comfort can be taken from the fact that it is hard to 
imagine any district attorney prosecuting anyone under this penal 
statute, and if all else fails, perhaps the statute could be challenged 
on a “void for vagueness” basis.241 But the fact remains that no 
attempt was made to coordinate this statute with the articles of the 
Mineral Code, resulting in uncertainty about which statute controls 
in a co-ownership situation that articles 166 and/or 175 seemingly 
address.242 
XIII. WHAT IS THE WORTH OF A MINERAL RIGHT IF THE REQUISITE 
CONSENT CANNOT BE OBTAINED? 
Despite the language in the early cases that a mineral lease 
granted by one co-owner is “null in so far as the co-owner is 
                                                                                                             
 238. “Whoever violates this Subsection shall be fined not less than five 
hundred dollars nor more than five thousand dollars or imprisoned for not 
less than thirty days nor more than six months, or both.” LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 30:217(A)(3) (2007). 
 239. “‘Owner’ as used herein shall not include a person or legal entity with only 
a surface or subsurface leasehold interest in the property.” Id. § 30:217(A)(2). 
 240. See id. § 31:6 (2000) (“The landowner has the exclusive right to explore 
and develop his property for the production of such minerals and to reduce them 
to possession and ownership.”). 
 241. “A statute is unconstitutionally vague if an ordinary person of reasonable 
intelligence is not capable of discerning its meaning and conforming his conduct 
thereto.” State v. Hair, 784 So. 2d 1269, 1274 (La. 2001). 
 242. While one should not be unmindful of the instruction of article 2 of the 
Mineral Code that “[i]n the event of conflict between the provisions of this Code 
and those of the Civil Code or other laws[,] the provisions of this Code shall 
prevail,” this is of little comfort in view of a criminal statute’s possible 
relevance. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:2 (emphasis added). 
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concerned,”243 the lease is still valid between the lessor and the 
lessee. Actually, this is explicitly recognized in the text of article 
166 where it states that a “co-owner of land may grant a valid 
mineral lease . . . as to his undivided interest in the land but the 
lessee or permittee may not exercise his rights thereunder without 
consent of co-owners owning at least an undivided eighty percent 
interest in the land.”244 
A similar observation is drawn from article 164 under which, 
by stating that a “co-owner of land may create a mineral servitude 
out of his undivided interest in the land” and that “prescription 
commences from the date of its creation,”245 one must conclude 
that the servitude is valid and effective (inasmuch as prescription 
has begun to accrue) but simply cannot be used unless and until the 
requisite consent is acquired and the proviso is met. Hence, the 
failure or inability to obtain the requisite consent does not render 
the mineral right invalid or without any value whatsoever. Rather, 
it simply means that no operations may be conducted on the 
surface of the land pursuant to that mineral right. 
If the mineral servitude owner cannot operate on the land 
because it is unable to obtain the requisite consent as either article 
164 or 175 requires or if the owner of a mineral lease cannot 
operate on the land because it is unable to obtain the requisite 
consent as article 166 requires, is there any value to the mineral 
right which it holds? 
Yes. Even though the owner of such a mineral right is not able 
to conduct drilling operations on the surface of the land due to the 
absence of the required consent, it is still a valid mineral servitude 
or mineral lease. Thus, if the land in question is unitized with a 
well drilled on another tract in the unit, then the mineral right is 
valid and the owner thereof is entitled to participate in production 
to the extent provided by law. Clearly, participation in a producing 
unit on which the unit well is situated on another tract does not 
violate the prohibition of the conduction of operations on the co-
owned tract of land. 
It is also possible that E&P operations could be conducted on 
the land pursuant to a different, discrete operational mineral right 
for which the requisite consent has been obtained (or is 
unnecessary because of the inapplicability of articles 164, 166, and 
175). In such an event, the use of a mineral servitude inures to the 
                                                                                                             
 243. Gulf Refining Co. of La. v. Carroll, 82 So. 277, 279 (La. 1919). 
 244. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:166 (emphasis added). 
 245. Id. § 31:164. 
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benefit of all co-owners of that servitude,246 and the mineral lease 
would be maintained because the activities that are sufficient to 
maintain the lease need not be performed personally.247 
Although no case has considered the issue of whether the 
mineral servitude could be exercised or the mineral lease could be 
availed by the drilling of a directional well to be completed under 
the tract of land (with no surface operations being conducted), it 
would seem that without the requisite consent, no such operations 
could take place. Article 490 of the Louisiana Civil Code provides: 
Unless otherwise provided by law, the ownership of a tract 
of land carries with it the ownership of everything that is 
directly above or under it.  
 
The owner may make works on, above, or below the land 
as he pleases, and draw all the advantages that accrue from 
them, unless he is restrained by law or by rights of 
others.248 
Hence, the rights of a co-owner to object, or certainly withhold 
consent, are as availing with respect to the subsurface as they are 
to the surface of the land. 
XIV. CONCLUSION 
Land that is owned in indivision is far from atypical. An 
operator desiring to operate in a given area will most certainly 
encounter at least one tract with multiple co-owners.  
The Louisiana Legislature has struck a reasonable balance of 
interests by abrogating a rule—as historic and traditional as it 
might have been—that frustrated the desires of a large majority of 
co-owners who wished to conduct oil and gas operations. The law 
now embraces a rule that permits operations on the co-owned land 
if at least 80% of the co-owners authorized it, while also affording 
                                                                                                             
 246. “A use or possession of a mineral right inures to the benefit of all co-
owners of the right.” Id. § 31:174. See also id. § 31:42–43. 
 247. “Performance may be rendered by a third person, even against the will 
of the obligee, unless the obligor or the obligee has an interest in performance 
only by the obligor.” LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1855 (2008). See also Delatte v. 
Woods, 94 So. 2d 281 (1957) (rejecting an argument that operations must be 
conducted by the lessee personally) (“The exercise of such rights could not be 
accomplished if it were literally intended by the parties that the defendant 
[lessee] should personally perform drilling obligations.”). 
 248. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 490 (2010). See also Logan v. State Gravel 
Co., 103 So. 526, 527 (La. 1925) (noting that real estate cannot be destroyed 
because “land” runs downward to the center of the earth). 
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an opportunity for a reluctant co-owner to enjoy the same benefits 
as other co-owners.  
The public interest in the development of the state’s natural 
resources is advanced inasmuch as wells that would otherwise not 
be drilled (due to a small minority of co-owners) can now be 
drilled without doing economic harm to the interests of those who 
are not as enthusiastic as others. 
  
